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Tara Skadegaard Thorsen: 




I denne artikel foreslås det, at interpersonel validering af kollektive følelser 
afhænger af en persons mulighed for at dele følelser med andre medlemmer af 
en gruppe. Det gør det muligt, at kollektive følelser, der haves I isolation, kan 
blive interpersonelt valideret. For at udvikle hovedargumentet præsenteres der 
i artiklen to påstande:  
 
Først foretages en konceptuel afklaring af forskellene mellem kollektive 
følelser, delte følelser og andre gruppefølelser. Det argumenteres, at kollektive 
følelser adskiller sig fra, og ikke kan reduceres til, delte følelser. I forlængelse 
heraf argumenteres det, at både delte og kollektive følelser er specifikke typer 
gruppefølelser. Herefter skelnes mellem kollektive følelser og andre 
gruppefølelser, som eksempelvis smitsomme følelser. Slutvis beskrives, 
hvordan kollektive følelser er strukturelt relateret til delte følelser.  
 
Dernæst introduceres en skelnen mellem, hvad der i artiklen kaldes objektivt 
gruppemedlemskab og intersubjektivt gruppemedlemskab. I sporet af Joona 
Taipales adskillelse af gruppeidentitet fra gruppemedlemskab (2017) tager 
denne artikel fat i Taipales begreber med en yderligere distinktion under 
gruppemedlemskab, inspireret af Edith Steins definitioner af ”community” 
(fællesskab/kommune) og ”society” (samfund) (2000). Intersubjektivt 
medlemskab relaterer til Steins begreb om ”community” og har at gøre med, 
hvordan andre mulige medlemmer i en gruppe ville anerkende en persons 
medlemskab i gruppen.  
 
Interpersonel validering af kollektive følelser udlægges hermed som afhængig 
af en persons intersubjektive gruppemedlemskab, hvilket igen afhænger af, 
hvordan mulige andre anerkender en person som medlem af en gruppe. 
Forståelsen af mulige andre er inspireret af Dan Zahavis læsning af Edmund 
Husserls diskussioner om intersubjektivitet (Zahavi 1997; 2017).  
 
Hovedargumentet for artiklen er hermed, at kollektive følelser kan valideres 
interpersonelt, hvis mulige andre medlemmer af en gruppe ville dele følelser 
med den person, der har en kollektiv følelse. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article proposes that interpersonal validation in collective emotions 
depends on a person’s possibility to share emotions with other members of a 
group. This allows for interpersonal validation of collective emotions in 
isolation.  
To develop the main argument, the article presents two claims: 
First, I introduce conceptual distinctions between collective emotions, shared 
emotions and other group emotions. I argue that collective emotions are 
different from and cannot be reduced to shared emotions. I further argue that 
both shared emotions and collective emotions are specific types of group 
emotions. Finally, I distinguish between collective emotions and other group 
emotions, such as contagious emotions, in order to finally clarify how collective 
emotions are structurally related to shared emotions.  
Second, I introduce a distinction between what I call objective group 
membership and intersubjective group membership. To do so, I follow Joona 
Taipale’s distinction between group identification and group membership 
(2017), where I continue to distinguish between what I call objective and 
intersubjective group membership, inspired by Edith Stein’s distinction 
between community and society (2000).  Intersubjective membership relates to 
Stein’s concept of community and depends on how other possible members of 
a group recognize a person’s membership in that group.  
I argue that interpersonal validation of collective emotions depends on a 
person’s intersubjective group membership, which in turn depends on how 
possible others conceive of you as a member of a group. My understanding of 
possible others is inspired by Dan Zahavi’s reading of Edmund Husserl’s 
discussions on intersubjectivity (Zahavi 1997; 2017). 
The main argument in the article is thus that a collective emotion is 
interpersonally validated if possible other members of a group would share 
that emotion with the person having a collective emotion. 
 
EMNEORD 
Collective emotions, group membership, shared emotions, intersubjectivity 
KEYWORDS 
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If1 you were politically active, you would still be part of your political group 
even when you were not around your peers. But if you were placed in isolation, 
and then had a collective emotion with your community, could your emotion 
be interpersonally validated by them?  
In this article I propose that interpersonal validation in collective emotions 
occurs through the possibility to share emotions with possible other members 
of a group. By introducing an example of a person with collective emotions in 
isolation, I explore a paradigmatic example in which collective emotions cannot 
be explained through a person’s environment.  
The article examines the subjective experience of collective emotions. It limits 
itself to interrogating the possibility for interpersonal validation of collective 
emotions. In this sense, the article is a study into when and how collective 
emotions are had between several people.  
I introduce two claims that are necessary for developing my main proposal. 
The first provides a clarification of the thematic context in which the main 
proposal will be advanced. I propose conceptual distinctions between 
collective emotions, group emotions, and shared emotions. I understand 
shared emotions as emotions shared between persons that are mutually aware 
of each other, where there is some spacio-temporal proximity between them, at 
least in their most basic cases2. I understand collective emotions as possible 
through group identification. I understand group emotions as the umbrella 
term of emotions that are group based, including shared and collective 
                                                 
1 This article was only possible through the incredible and thorough advice, guidance and 
dialogue I have received. Thank you, Andreas Sidenius for your thorough comments and 
discussions on the paper. Thank you, Mira Skadegaard for your invaluable feedback and 
support. Most importantly, thank you Felipe León, without whom this article would never 
have been possible. Your advice, guidance and friendly discussions have shaped both the 
article and my thinking. Thank you to the anonymous reviewers, whose reviews cleverly 
challenged assumptions and shortcomings of the article.  
2 My understanding of shared emotions is informed by Felipe León, Dan Zahavi and Thomas 
Szanto’s article “Emotional sharing and the extended mind” (2016). 
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emotions, and further emotions that are had with others through the influence 
of one’s social or physical environment (Hatfield et. al. 2014; Hess et. al. 2014; 
Krueger 2015; 2018). These distinctions serve as conceptual clarifications, and 
in this way do not mean to suggest that different group emotions cannot 
influence each other or occur together. I merely distinguish between them in 
order to differentiate distinctive features of collective emotions from other 
group emotions.  
Second, I introduce a clarification of group membership which constitutes part 
of the answer to the main question of the article. I propose that membership in 
groups can be both objective and intersubjective and build on Edith Stein’s 
distinction between community and society (2000). Objective membership 
means factual membership, as is the case when delimiting a group of people, 
for example those taller than 170cm. Intersubjective membership means 
membership that depends on other members’ validations of a person’s 
membership in a group.  
The article is divided into two sections. Section one focuses on delimiting the 
experiential criteria that should be met for an emotion to be collective. Here I 
establish the way in which I find collective emotions to be based on group 
identification. I further introduce the concept of togetherness, which informs a 
distinction between coincidental aggregates of similar emotions in groups, and 
emotions that are experienced together as a group. The preliminary 
delimitation of collective emotions introduced in section one shows in which 
way one can distinguish between an interpersonally validated collective 
emotion, and a collective emotion that is not interpersonally validated. In 
section two I then propose that interpersonal validation can occur through 
group membership. I propose a distinction between objective membership and 
intersubjective membership and argue that collective emotions can be 
interpersonally validated through intersubjective membership.  
The article is structured around the guiding hypothetical example of a person 
having a collective emotion in isolation. This serves as a paradigmatic example 
of collective emotions where a person’s emotional state cannot be explained 
through their social or physical surroundings. Isolation is used interchangeably 
with confinement. This means I do not consider the differences of experience 
when a person is simply isolated from the specific group that they have an 
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emotion with, and situations where a person is in solitary confinement. The 
reason for this is that for my purposes, it is not necessary to discuss degrees of 
isolation. It is relevant, however, that a person is isolated from the group she 
has a collective emotion with. It is important to note, though, that there are 
several factors that can influence a person’s self-experience when in solitary 
confinement, such as losing the ability to differentiate between oneself and 
others (Guenther 2013; Gallagher 2014). Because of this, I restrict my use of 
isolation to account only for hypothetical cases where a person is not suffering 
from the consequences of solitary confinement. Isolation is understood here in 
terms of a person who is isolated from her community and entities that could 
influence her feeling with her community. 
 
1. Collective emotions 
Collective emotions are emotions that a person experiences having with a 
group or a collective that she identifies herself as part of. That is, collective 
emotions require group identification, and some sense of togetherness with the 
group she identifies with.  
 
1.1 Collective emotions, shared emotions and group emotions 
There is no consensus in the field of shared and collective emotions, regarding 
what the conditions of possibility for them are, nor which phenomena count as 
collective emotions. Some scholars argue that when a person has a collective 
emotion, she is emotionally affected by her social environment’s emotional 
attitudes, also specified by some as emotional contagion (Hess et. al. 2014; 
Hatfield et. al. 2014). Others argue that shared and collective emotions are 
molded by a person’s social and physical environment (Krueger 2015; 2018). 
Moreover, many scholars do not distinguish between shared and collective 
emotions (Salmela 2014; Krueger 2015; 2018; Thonhauser 2018). 
I distinguish collective emotions both from shared emotions and from what I 
call group emotions. My account of collective emotions develops from Felipe 
León, Dan Zahavi and Thomas Szanto’s proposed account of shared emotions 
(2016). They argue that shared emotions are realized through reciprocal other-
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awareness and constitutive integration. Reciprocal other-awareness means that 
individuals are mutually aware of each other. This ensures that a shared 
emotion is experienced as being had together with others and as being had by 
more than one person. Constitutive integration means that a person’s 
emotional experience is constituted through integration of that other person’s 
emotional experience: “[…] the subjective character of an individual’s 
emotional experience can extend to and incorporate the subjective character of 
another individual’s emotional experience, such that both stand in a 
relationship of constitutive integration.” (León et. al. 2016, sect. 1).  
León et. al. distinguish between shared and collective emotions, as shared 
emotions depend on reciprocal other-awareness. They argue that collective 
emotions can’t depend on this, since collective emotions are not had with some 
individual others with whom a person can be mutually aware, but with many, 
not necessarily individually differentiated members of a group. Collective 
emotions and shared emotions thus differ in the following way: shared 
emotions occur between individuals who are reciprocally aware of each other 
and constitutively integrate the emotional state of the other person as a 
condition for their own (León et. al. 2016). Collective emotions are had by 
individuals with members of a group, without there necessarily being 
reciprocal other-awareness.  
Imagine a person who has been isolated from her community through 
imprisonment, due to political actions she has performed with her community. 
While in isolation, and when thinking of the situation of her community, she 
experiences collective emotions like anger and grief from the unjust actions that 
have been taken against them.  
If an account of collective emotions is to cover phenomena such as a person 
having collective emotions in isolation, then reciprocal other-awareness cannot 
be a necessary condition. This means that if collective emotions can be had in 
isolation, they cannot depend on mutual awareness. Mutual awareness, 
however, may still influence the way in which a person has a collective 
emotion.  
While shared emotions and collective emotions are different, they also have 
traits in common. Both are emotions that are experienced as being had with 
others. When I am happy with my best friend, I feel it as us being happy 
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together, and not just her and I respectively being happy (Drummond 2002; 
Zahavi 2015; León 2018). Shared emotions and collective emotions are both 
incidences of more than mere coincidences of similar emotions (Salmela 2014). 
For example, imagine a café full of sad people. At this café, people go to end 
relationships. Despite the very individual nature of each person’s emotional 
state, there is a great collection of sad feeling within one group of people; 
namely people who have just broken up with their partners at this specific cafe. 
This being the case, the accumulation of sad individuals still does not account 
for a collective emotion (not to mention shared emotions) since no individuals 
at the café are sad together. In this way, there is a difference between on the 
one side, coincidental similarity of emotions, and on the other, shared emotions 
and collective emotions.  
From the account developed here of collective emotions, and based on the 
account introduced by León et. al. on shared emotions, I further distinguish 
collective emotions from other group emotions. I understand group emotions 
to be an umbrella term for emotions people have with others, including shared 
emotions and collective emotions. Moreover, group emotions also account for 
what some scholars call emotional contagion (Hatfield, Carpenter and Rapson 
2014; Hess et. al. 2014; Salice and Taipale 2015).  
Emotional contagion means that the emotional states of some person/persons 
can influence another person’s emotional state through a contagious effect. 
Many scholars argue that emotional contagion acts as a precursor to collective 
emotions (Hatfield et. al. 2014). But if collective emotions in general should also 
include collective emotions that are had in isolation, then contagion cannot be 
a necessary precursor of collective emotions. A person in isolation will not be 
able to have collective emotions that derive from contagion, since that person 
is isolated from anyone they could “catch” an emotion from. Similar to 
mutuality, contagion might still influence the experience of a collective 
emotion, while it is not a necessary condition for collective emotions.  
Edith Stein puts forward an argument against reading collective emotions as a 
result of contagion in her book Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(2000). To Stein, collective emotions have a distinct intentional and phenomenal 
structure (Stein 2000), which can be described as a “we-mode” (Szanto 2015). 
Contagion, in contrast, is intrinsically self-centered (Zahavi 2015). In this way, 
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a collective emotion does not derive from contagion since contagion does not 
require a person to identify with others for them to catch an emotion.  
To exemplify this distinction between contagion and collective emotions, 
imagine a person at a football match, with a crowd of people who are yelling 
excitedly at the game. She is not a fan and doesn’t care much about football, but 
she gets strongly affected by the atmosphere at the stadium and feels excited. 
When she is out of the vicinity of the yelling crowd, she no longer feels any 
excitement and doesn’t really understand why she was so excited in the first 
place3.  
This can be deemed emotional contagion. Importantly, the visitor at the football 
match doesn’t identify with the crowd she catches an emotion from. That is, 
while she does in the situation have an emotion with the excited collective of 
fans, she isn’t having it as a person who identifies with the collective. In this 
way, contagion does not necessarily imply identification with a collective since 
contagion can occur without it. 
So far, I have distinguished between shared emotions, collective emotions, and 
group emotions such as contagion. Shared emotions are had between subjects 
who are reciprocally aware of each other. Collective emotions are had by 
individuals who, by identifying with a group, experience collective emotions. 
Group emotions is the umbrella term for all emotions that are related to groups, 
including shared emotions, collective emotions, and contagious emotions.  
At this point, collective emotions are conceptually distinguished from other 
group emotions. From this distinction it is possible to ask what the conditions 
of possibility are for collective emotions to be had in isolation.  
 
1.2 Group identification 
For shared emotions, a necessary precursor for feeling with each other is that 
subjects identify with each other (León et. al. 2016). But in collective emotions, 
a person identifies with a group rather than an individual.  
                                                 
3 This example was similarly introduced by Salice and Taipale (2015). 
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Group identification is different than identification in shared emotions as it is 
mainly self-referential. This means that when I identify with a group, I identify 
myself as fitting into that group. This self-referential side to group 
identification can also be explained through self-categorization. When a person 
self-categorizes, it means she understands herself as part of a specific category. 
In group identification, this means categorizing herself to be part of a specific 
group.  
Group identification does not mean that a person identifies with individually 
differentiated members of a group (Tajfel 1984; Salice and Taipale 2015; Edith 
Stein 2000; Szanto 2015). It means that she identifies with the group as such.  
In Joona Taipale’s 2017 article on the structure of group identification, Taipale 
argues that a person identifies with groups both through identification with a 
group type, and a group token (Taipale 2017). A group type is an abstracted 
ideal of a group member. This means that when a person identifies with a 
group, her identification is in many ways an identification with the group type, 
involving a pursuit of becoming the group type. Further, when she identifies 
with other members, she identifies with them through the way in which they 
are related to the group type, i.e. as tokens of the group type (Taipale 2017).  
Group identification involves both self-categorizing as a member of a group 
and identifying with other members of a group in relation to the group type. 
Take the person in isolation. If she identified with her community while in 
isolation, she might be able to also feel anger or grief with them. That is, her 
identification makes it possible for her to feel that she has an emotion together 
with her community. In this way, group identification is a condition for 
collective emotions. That is, group identification involves a person categorizing 
herself as part of a group and allows her to experience an emotion as one she 
has together with that group.  However, in contrast to togetherness in shared 
emotions, the togetherness a person experiences in group identification does 
not merit interpersonal validation, as it is mainly self-referential. In the 
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1.3 Togetherness 
I have argued that the togetherness a person experiences in collective emotions 
occurs through group identification, explaining how a person can have a 
collective emotion in isolation. 4 However, this account of togetherness does not 
explain how collective emotions can be interpersonally validated.  
For both shared and collective emotions, togetherness should make up the 
difference between a random collection of similar emotions and having 
emotions together. But while togetherness in both shared and collective 
emotions have that in common, togetherness plays different roles depending 
on whether an emotion is shared or collective. In shared emotions, togetherness 
occurs through reciprocal other-awareness (León et. al. 2016). In collective 
emotions, togetherness is experienced through group identification, which is 
self-referential and, in this way, does not ensure that anyone else mutually feels 
together with a person. This leads to a problem of interpersonal validation of 
collective emotions.5  
In his 2015 article “Collective Emotions, Normativity and Empathy: A Steinian 
Account”, Thomas Szanto gives an account of collective emotions relying on 
some aggregation of shared emotions. Szanto does not want to reduce 
collective emotions to shared emotions, but he also recognizes that 
interpersonal reference might depend on some group-related sharing of 
emotions.  
Szanto argues that members of a group can have collective emotions if there is 
what he calls a shared emotional culture, involving a shared appraisal pattern 
that relates to the group with which a collective emotion is had. Further, it is 
necessary that members of a group are mutually aware to have collective 
                                                 
4 Togetherness is not necessarily emotional. You can act or intend or build things with others, without 
feeling with them, while still being together. As an example, togetherness plays a role when two 
people collaborate on building a house (Tuomela 2005), or when they walk together (Gilbert 1990). 
5 Togetherness is not only possible through identification or group identification. Imagine for example 
the person at a football match who did not identify with the crowd of fans that she was having an 
emotion with. While she did not have a collective emotion with them, she still felt together with the 
crowd. She wasn’t individually cheering. In this sense, togetherness is a structural element of group 
emotions. In collective emotions, specifically, I argue that togetherness occurs through a person’s 
identifying with a group.  
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emotions. This can either be directly through perception, or indirectly through 
some mediated manner, where cultural artefacts or similar informs shared 
appraisal patterns (Szanto 2015 pg. 16-18).  His account is informed by Edith 
Stein’s argument that collective emotions must have shared emotions 
embedded in them (Szanto 2015 pg. 3; Stein 2000, pg. 130-137).  
Szanto’s account of collective emotions inspires the one proposed in this thesis. 
However, following his account, a person in isolation cannot have collective 
emotions, since she cannot perceive others directly or indirectly. In this sense, 
Szanto’s account does not cover phenomena of collective emotions in isolation. 
If one is to respect the proposition that a person can have a collective emotion 
in isolation, then collective emotions can’t demand reciprocity in the same way 
that shared emotions can. I argue that togetherness can also be experienced 
through group identification. If I identify with a group, it is possible that I could 
feel together with them. However, togetherness in group identification is self-
referential and as such cannot inform as to whether other people are also 
feeling with some other person. A person’s identification with or having 
emotions with a group does not ensure that the members of a group have 
emotions with her.  
Togetherness in group identification cannot account for interpersonal 
validation in collective emotions. In the following section I examine the 
possibility for interpersonal validation of collective emotions through a 
person’s group membership.  
 
2. Intersubjectivity in group membership 
When a person has a collective emotion, she experiences that emotion as one 
that other members of a group would have with her. But having her emotion 
based on group identification does not ensure that any other individuals of a 
group would recognize her as a group member. Group identification is a 
person’s subjective identification with a group and does not imply that other 
members of a group would also feel with her.  
In this section, I look at the role of intersubjectivity in group membership and 
the relationship between group membership and group identification. First, I 
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introduce Taipale’s definition of both group identification and membership 
(Taipale 2017). Thereafter, I discuss a specific type of group membership that I 
argue is constitutive of interpersonal validation in collective emotions, by 
drawing on intersubjectivity as discussed by Dan Zahavi (1997; 2015; 2017).  
Taipale argues that group membership is a matter of fact, as it is objective or 
institutional. Group identification, in contrast, has to do with a subject’s 
identification with a group, and is in this sense subjective. Though group 
identification is only subjective, it also fosters group conformity, which in turn 
allows people who group identify to behave more like group members (Taipale 
2017 pg. 4). In the following, I discuss the notion of membership. I concur that 
objective and institutionalized membership are ways to have membership in 
groups, and I add that membership might also be more than a matter of fact. I 
argue for an account of group membership that includes intersubjectivity, to 
properly account for interpersonal validation in collective emotions. 
This section introduces a proposed distinction between what I call objective 
membership and intersubjective membership, inspired by a distinction 
between society and community6, developed by Stein in Philosophy of Psychology 
and the Humanities (2000). While a person is a member of a society due to 
institutionalization (i.e. objective membership), one is a member of a 
community due to the organizing force of living together (i.e. intersubjective 
membership) (Stein 2000 pg. 130; Szanto 2015).  
Based on the account given of intersubjective membership in the following 
section, I end with this proposal: If possible other members of a group were to 
share an emotion that a person has with them, then that person has an 
interpersonally validated collective emotion.  
 
 
                                                 
6 In the English translation of Stein’s book “gemeinschaft” and “gesellschaft” is translated to 
“community” and “association” (Stein 2000). Thomas Szanto (2015) translates this to community and 
society, as does Gerhard Thonhauser (2018). I follow Szanto and Thonhauser’s translation here. Stein 
borrows her distinction from the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (2017). 
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2.1 Group membership 
Taipale (2017) argues that group identification describes the subjective 
experience of identifying with a group while group membership is the relation 
a person has to a group, regardless of her experience of what her relation to 
them is. That is, a person can identify with a group without being a member of 
a group, and similarly, she can be a member of a group without necessarily 
identifying with that group.  
According to Taipale, group membership is understood as a person’s factual 
belonging to a group, which is objective and/or institutional (Taipale 2017). 
Taipale exemplifies this with babies, who are, unbeknownst to themselves, still 
members of the human society, as they are protected as such through the law. 
Taipale’s description of group membership does not go much further than this, 
as he focuses on the structure of group identification. Here, I take up group 
membership and distinguish between on the one side what I call objective 
membership, and on the other, intersubjective membership. Intersubjective 
membership, I argue, makes interpersonal validation of collective emotions 
possible.  
Sometimes membership is straightforward and uniform, as when a person is a 
member of a political party, or when she has a passport confirming her 
nationality. Other times, criteria for membership in groups can be blurry, or 
even contradictory depending on the member you ask. That is, membership is 
not always settled, as it is not always objective facts or institutionalized 
practices that determine whether a person is a member of a group or not.  
I develop my account of objective and intersubjective membership by turning 
to Stein’s distinction between society and community. While societal 
membership can be explained as a mechanical, rational union, communal 
membership is a natural, organic union of individuals living with each other 
(Stein 2000, pg. 130). In this way, for pure societies (which, she argues, does not 
actually exist anywhere), every single member is lonely. But in communities, 
they live together.  
This means that for group membership, the factual, mechanical membership 
shaped through institutions or similar, doesn’t posit that people are together. 
This account of societies informs my concept of objective membership. For 
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example, objective membership can be objective in the sense that it could mean 
membership in a group of all people taller than 170cm. A person who is an 
objective member of this group does not have her membership develop from 
her living with, or organically developing a relation to other people taller than 
170cm. It only means that she, objectively speaking, belongs in that group.  
Intersubjective membership is inspired by Stein’s account of communities. 
Here, “living with” each other defines and shapes communities. Intersubjective 
membership might be experienced through political events, where people 
come together over their shared beliefs in political agendas, and thus develop 
their group membership through their ways of living together and developing 
beliefs and opinions together, which in turn informs what membership in a 
group means.  
Intersubjective membership is understood here as membership depending on 
other people’s recognition of a person’s membership in that group. That is, 
intersubjective membership is not a question of how people are institutionally 
grouped together. It is a question of how individuals would or wouldn’t 
recognize other individuals as members of a given group.  
For collective emotions, a person’s group identification should match their 
intersubjective membership. It is not necessary that it matches objective 
membership, as only intersubjective membership involves other people. If my 
emotion is to be had with other members of a collective, it only matters that 
other members of that group recognize me as a member that they would have 
emotions with.  
Consider a person who has been expelled from a political party and is thus no 
longer an objective member. She still feels collective anger with the party when 
they lose an election sometime after her expulsion. Could this person still have 
an interpersonally validated collective emotion despite her expulsion? For her 
collective emotion to be interpersonally validated, someone must have the 
emotion with her. If she was expelled despite different members disagreeing 
on whether she should be so or not, it would mean that, while some members 
would not have an emotion with her, others would. In this sense, her emotion 
could be interpersonally validated, as some members, based on their 
perception of her membership, could feel anger with her.  
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On this basis, I put forth three proposals of what intersubjective membership 
entails:  
First, intersubjective membership is less settled than objective membership. 
Objective membership is a question of either being or not being a member. 
Intersubjective membership is not decided by one fact, but a plenitude of other 
people that interpersonally validate a person’s membership. They can have 
contrasting opinions, but some group members can still validate one person’s 
collective emotion. This leads to the next point:  
Collective emotions do not require consensus from all possible members. On 
the contrary, a person can have a collective emotion with only a few other 
members of a group that would possibly validate her membership. In this 
sense, whether a person is an intersubjective member of a group does not 
depend on the number of people who would or would not validate that 
person’s membership.  
Finally, collective emotions do not depend on objective membership, but on 
intersubjective membership. That is, irrespective of a person’s objective 
membership, if some other members of a group could feel with her based on 
how they perceive her group membership, she could have collective emotions 
with them. Intersubjective membership in this way plays an essential role for 
interpersonal validation, while objective membership does not matter to 
collective emotions.  
In sum, independently of a person’s subjective identification, membership 
establishes who is part of a group and who is not. Intersubjective membership, 
specifically, makes it possible for a person to have interpersonally validated 
collective emotions with a group.  
At this point, it is relevant to look at who the people validating a collective 
emotion through intersubjective membership are. My proposal is that 
intersubjective membership is structured through possible others’ recognition 
of a person’s membership in a group. I develop my argument to lean on 
possible others in group membership in the next subsection.  
Intersubjective membership allows for some interpersonal reference, which we 
have so far lost when moving from shared emotions to collective emotions. This 
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type of interpersonal reference is different from that of shared emotions as it 
depends on possible others in intersubjective membership, rather than mutual 
awareness.  This leads me to examine how possible others can validate 
something. I draw on Dan Zahavi’s work on formal intersubjectivity in the 
following in order to inspire a proposal of how possible others partake in 
collective emotions. 
 
2.2 Horizontality of emotions 
In his 1997 Article “Horizontal Intentionality and Transcendental 
Intersubjectivity” Dan Zahavi discusses the role of the other in Husserl’s 
definition of intersubjectivity. He specifically looks at the way in which 
intersubjectivity participates in how things meaningfully appear to a subject. 
That is, when a person perceives a thing, that thing is perceived not just as the 
surface or perspective presented to a person, but as a full, meaningful entity. 
This meaning with which an object appears is an intersubjective meaning 
pertaining to the horizon of a thing.  
To Zahavi, intersubjectivity in horizons is explained as follows: when a thing 
appears for a subject, that thing appears in a meaningful way due to how 
possible others could perceive the thing from different perspectives. In this 
way, a thing’s meaningful appearance is about other possible subject’s 
perception of that thing, which takes part as the horizon of an actual subject’s 
perception of a thing.  
What I wish to emphasize by this is the role of the possible other. The horizon 
of a thing is made up of possible other perceptions of it, even though those 
other perceptions are not necessarily realized by anyone. They are simply 
possibilities.  
Similarly, for interpersonal validation of collective emotions in isolation, one 
cannot depend on actual others’ perceptions of a person’s suitability as a 
member of a group. But a person could have her membership related to the 
horizon of herself, as an object to others. This would mean that a person’s 
horizon, with regard to her membership in a group, depends on how possible 
others would validate her as a member.  
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For example, if I were to identify as a philosopher, that identification could 
match my membership if possible others would recognize me as a philosopher. 
My intersubjective membership in a group thus depends on possible others. 
But exactly who are those possible others determining my membership? Is it 
just any other person, or is it specifically a possible other member of the group 
I am a member of? Imagine I was seen by some as a philosopher, even though 
I never studied philosophy. Simultaneously, no educated philosopher 
recognizes me as a philosopher. Still, having gained a reputation as a writer 
through publishing popular literature, calling it philosophy, many people from 
the general society do think of me as a philosopher, not distinguishing me from 
any other educated philosopher.  
To have a collective emotion with educated philosophers would require that 
the members of the collective recognized me as a member if we were to feel 
together. In this way, I cannot have a collective emotion with other educated 
philosophers without both identifying myself as a philosopher and having 
educated philosophers recognize me as a member. At the same time, group 
membership without collective emotions does not have to be settled only by 
other members. Possible others that would see me as a philosopher could affect 
what membership I have. Such a membership would only be limited, as other 
members would not feel together with me. In this sense, any possible others 
can influence what groups I am a member of, but this membership is only 
communal in the sense Stein puts forth, as membership where people can feel 
and be together if possible other members also recognize one’s membership. 
For the person in isolation, she can have an interpersonally validated collective 
emotion if interpersonal validation depends on possible other members of a 
group. If possible other members of her community would recognize her as a 
member, then her collective emotion could be interpersonally validated, seeing 
that the possible members would also share that emotion with her.  
This suggests how collective emotions contribute to defining and delimiting 
membership in groups as it is negotiated by members of a group. Collective 
emotions have been researched with a focus on the influence that collective 
emotions towards other groups have on members of those other groups (Tajfel 
1984). However, in this account, it is intragroup relations that are examined. 
This is so because the possibility of having interpersonally validated collective 
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emotions does not depend on possible others in general, but on possible 
members of a group7.  
In sum, while collective emotions have to do with possible other members, the 
horizon of a person as a member of a group can have to do with any possible 
others. But the influence of possible others that are not themselves members of 
a group is limited and does not account for intersubjective membership, as they 
cannot validate a person’s membership to allow them to behave and feel with 
other members of that group. Consequently, at this point, we can define 
intersubjective membership in collective emotions as being established 
between possible group members. A person’s horizon involves possible other 
members. Their possibility to have a collective emotion with her by recognizing 
her as a group member makes up her intersubjective membership. 
Turning back to isolation, if collective emotions are interpersonally validated 
through possible other members, then collective emotions do not require any 
actual others to validate a person’s collective emotion. Collective emotions 
could in this way be had in isolation, if possible other members of a group 
would have that emotion with her. That said, would collective emotions not 
still require some level of actualization to be real? I understand this to mean 
that even if only one person were ever to actually have a collective emotion, it 
is still interpersonally validated if possible other members would have that 
emotion with her.8  
 
 
                                                 
7 The notion that collective emotions depend on possible other members of a group invites an 
examination of how members of a group together negotiate group membership. That is, while it might 
be possible to establish membership for people who are not themselves members of a group, collective 
emotions could affect other people’s definitions or stereotypes, taking over the defining power of who 
is a group member and who is not, and what such members might feel. At the same time, it also 
invites an examination of what dynamics make members of a group exclude other people as non-
members through not feeling with them.  
8 I argue that interpersonal validation of a collective emotion does not have to be realized, but I cannot 
argue that a person’s membership in a group shouldn’t be. This would require further research into 
the criteria for establishing intersubjective membership.   
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2.3 Ambiguities 
In this subsection, I engage with an ambiguity arising from this account of 
interpersonal validation in collective emotions, introduced in the previous 
subsection, regarding how membership is established if there is no uniform 
tendency among possible others of recognizing membership.  
How do collective emotions influence group membership? Turning again to 
the example of a political party member, imagine that she has publicly spoken 
against the political line of the party, which has led to discussions of whether 
she should be excluded from the party. Simultaneously, the party is being 
publicly scrutinized by other politicians for something unrelated, which is why 
she feels collective anger about the scrutiny. Her collective emotion would be 
interpersonally validated even though some wouldn’t agree to that validation. 
In this way, collective emotions participate in establishing membership. That 
is, if one member of a group validates another person’s collective emotion, then 
other people who are members of that group, whether they themselves would 
validate an emotion or not, are part of the collective with which a person feels. 
That is, collective emotions are not democratic; it is not necessarily a question 
of how many people in a group would have an emotion with another person 
based on group membership. It is more a question of whether some members 
would. This means that collective emotions participate in establishing 
membership in a rather specific way, namely as negotiations. That is, who one 
person would recognize as a member can be contradicted by others, making a 
person an intersubjective member of a group, even if some other members 
wouldn’t agree. While it might sound like a contradiction in terms, this 
possibility might offer an insight into what the role of the possible other in 
membership does, and how it differs from shared emotions.   
To better understand what this means, it can be related to reciprocity in shared 
emotions. Sharing depends on actual reciprocation with anyone, while for 
collective emotions, the possible others one feels with is restricted to possible 
members of a collective. For example, I can share an emotion with a random 
person in an elevator without ever having to group identify with some common 
group. The only condition is that I can recognize the other person as a “you” to 
“me”, and that they can reciprocally recognize me as such (León, et. al. 2016; 
Zahavi 2015).  
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When I have a collective emotion, I don’t have it with just anyone. Instead, my 
emotion is limited to the possible members of group that I identify with. While 
I cannot distinguish them individually, interpersonal validation of my emotion 
occurs through the possibility that some members would have that collective 
emotion with me, by also recognizing me as a member of that collective. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In this article, I distinguish collective emotions from both shared emotions and 
other group emotions like contagion.  I argue that shared emotions are different 
from collective emotions in the following way: shared emotions are structured 
on reciprocal other-awareness, ensuring that they are had with actual 
individual others. Collective emotions do not depend on reciprocal other-
awareness. Instead, collective emotions rely on group identification, and they 
are interpersonally validated through a person’s intersubjective group 
membership. In this sense, interpersonal validation of collective emotions is 
structured on the possibility of sharing emotions with group members, without 
this leading to collective emotions being reduced to an aggregate of shared 
emotions. This does not mean that collective emotions cannot involve members 
being mutually aware, or even sharing emotions in a group. It only means that 
mutual awareness and sharing are not necessary for collective emotions. 
This proposed account of collective emotions differs from other accounts, such 
as accounts relying on emotional contagion. I argue that emotional contagion 
is a group emotion, but it is not necessary for collective emotions. Since 
collective emotions depend on group identification, they are possible even in 
situations where a person cannot experience emotional contagion. This does 
not mean that contagion cannot influence how collective emotions are 
experienced. It only means that contagion is not necessary for collective 
emotions.  
Collective emotions are based on a person identifying with a group, but this 
does not ensure that a collective emotion is interpersonally validated. 
Collective emotions are interpersonally validated depending on whether 
possible members of a group would share emotions with a person. Such a 
possibility depends on what I call intersubjective membership, which is the 
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type of membership that is determined by whether other possible members of 
a group would recognize a person as a member of that group. I distinguish 
intersubjective membership from objective membership, where objective 
membership is one of facts or institutions, and intersubjective membership is 
membership that depends on other possible members of a group’s recognition 
of a person’s membership in that group.  
My distinction between intersubjective membership and objective membership 
is inspired by Edith Stein’s distinction between communities and societies. The 
proposed account of intersubjective membership is inspired by Dan Zahavi’s 
development of formal intersubjectivity, as inspired by Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology. My account of collective emotions is both inspired and 
developed from Felipe León, Dan Zahavi and Thomas Szanto’s account of 
shared emotions.  
As a concluding remark, it should be emphasized that this account of collective 
emotions is a proposal of a structure of the way collective emotions are 
interpersonally validated, which can also account for collective emotions that 
are had in isolation. I recognize that some might question whether collective 
emotions can even be had in isolation. I also recognize that this account directly 
contrasts with some accounts of collective emotions. But it also further 
develops other accounts. In this way, my proposition does not develop ideas 
from a field of consensus on collective emotions. My hope is that it can be used 
as a clarification of the different ways group emotions might occur.  
This article leaves open a few questions that are worth examining further. One 
question I find especially interesting is that of who the possible other is in 
collective emotions. For instance, can a person have her collective emotion 
interpersonally validated by possible other members of a group who are no 
longer alive, or who will become members in the future? This question might 
clarify or challenge the role of possibility set forth in this article. 
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